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1 Introduction 
The purpose of supply chain management is to 
produce and distribute products in the right 
quantities, to the right locations, and at the right 
time, with the aim of minimizing the costs while 
satisfying the customers to the fullest (Simchi-Levi 
et al., 2003). In a single product multi-echelon 
supply chain, a product passes through multiple 
stages/echelons before it is finally delivered to the 
end customer. In a linear decentralized supply 
chain, several inventory management agents, at 
each echelon, are responsible for inventory 
replenishment decisions. A linear supply chain 
acquires raw materials and/or components, 
converts them into finished goods, and finally 
distributes these products to customers. 
Therefore, adequate inventory management 
constitutes a key issue for supply chain efficiency. 
Availability of products on the one hand and 
reduction of inventory costs on the other hand 
contradict. Successful supply chain management 
requires therefore making a balance between 
these two conflicting issues. 
 
Replenishment decisions are vital for efficient 
inventory management. Unavailability of the 
products or any delay in delivering them can 
cause severe damages to the business; losing 
market share, eroding companies reputation and 
in some cases huge back order costs. Therefore, 
inventory replenishment decision or determining 
how much and when to order is one of the core 
issues of supply chain management. 
 
To answer these two fundamental questions, rules 
and procedures in inventory system, commonly 
known as replenishment policies, have been set. 
Still, many companies rely substantially on human 
decision-making; people use heuristics, rules of 
thumb and simplifications; they rely on traditions, 
organizational routines and formal hierarchies 
(Größler, 2004). Studies on inventory 
replenishment decision have typically assumed 
rational agent making decisions on the basis of 
normative models. However, human decision 
makers are prone to errors and biases. Not only 
an individual’s cognitive limits in terms of both 
knowledge and reasoning skills affect the decision 
making process (Simon, 1982) but also s/he can 
be biased by his/her emotion in processing the 
information (Harding et al., 2004). Hence, human 
decision makers are “bounded” when dealing with 
complex decision problems. Specific decision 
biases, cognitive limitations, bounded rationality, 
social preferences, motivational issues, or other 
behavioral factors, degrade the quality of human 
decisions and thus, deviations from optimal 
inventory policies often happen in practice.  
 
The impact of behavioral issues on industrial 
activity is studied extensively in many fields, 
including economics, accounting, marketing, and 
management. However, its study in operations 
management is relatively scarce (Bendoly et al., 
2006), but there is a growing interest in 
incorporating human behavior in inventory 
management studies. Behavioral decision theory 
(BDT) was developed to identify the cognitive 
limitations in the perception and processing of 
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information (Sterman, 1987). The research 
methodology used in this stream of literature is 
behavioral experiments.  By elucidating the 
decision rules and the behavioral factors, the 
behavioral experiments try to create a link 
between decisions and behavioral factors. 
 
An important behavioral factor in any decision 
making process is “trust”, which, despite its 
importance in supply chain, has rarely been 
studied. The imperfect information on intentions, 
competence, commitment and reputation of the 
other echelons in the supply chain, makes the 
decision makers highly dependent on the past 
behavior of their partners. Based on the past 
performances of its immediate upstream and 
downstream echelon, each decision maker builds 
a level of trust and performs based on this trust 
perception. 
  
The main objective of the present research is to 
study how trust is linked to the inventory 
replenishment decision indicators. While previous 
experimental studies have examined the effects of 
factors such as information sharing, learning, 
lead-time reduction, etc. in alleviating bullwhip 
effect, this research regards bullwhip, as well as 
excess inventory, huge backlogs and other 
inefficiencies of supply chain as the results of poor 
inventory replenishment decision making. To solve 
these issues, there is the need to realize how 
people decide in the first place. The decisions on 
how much to order and at what time intervals 
depend on various factors such as the level of on 
hand inventory, the supply line of the placed 
orders, the size and time interval of the orders 
received from downstream customers, the rate of 
order fulfillment by the suppliers, etc. Aiming to 
understand how people make inventory 
replenishment decisions under different trust 
conditions; this study uses a participatory 
simulation platform called “XBeer Game” 
(Montreuil et al. 2008) along with a survey on 
trust. 
  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 provides the literature review. Section 3 
gives an overview on the experimental set-up and 
procedure. Section 4 deals with the experimental 
results and discussions and finally section 5 
presents the conclusions. 
2 Literature review 
 
2.1 Trust in supply chain context 
Recent studies on trust between organizations 
focus on the benefits that trust can provide to 
improve competitive advantage (Barney & 
Hansen, 1994; Jarillo, 1988; Mohr & Spekman, 
1994). These studies note that trust is an 
antecedent for cooperation and also among the 
most common, and one of the most critical 
success factors of long term relationship between 
the firms. Rousseau et al.  (1998) believe that 
trust is neither a behavior nor a choice, but an 
underlying psychological condition that can lead to 
a behavior or a choice; thus, it is important to the 
organizational life. In the supply chain context, the 
term ‘company/supplier firm trust’ was used by 
many researchers (e.g. Chow & Holden, 1997; 
Doney & Cannon, 1997; Zaheer, et al., 1998) to 
measure the sense of overriding trust the buyer 
has in a supplier to act in good faith and deliver 
competently against required outcomes. Sako 
(1992) defines trust an expectation held by one 
trading partner (trustor) about another (trustee) 
that the latter will behave in a particular and 
mutually acceptable manner. Sako & Helper 
(1998) study the effect of trust among suppliers on 
reducing transaction costs and investment. Dyer & 
Chu (2003)  investigate the effect of trust between 
suppliers on reducing transaction cost in 
automotive industry in the United States, Japan 
and Korea; their findings show that 
trustworthiness lowers transaction costs. 
Handfield & Nichols (1999) discuss the 
importance of trust in supply chains and how the 
sharing of information and assets leads to 
success in a strategic partnership. Several 
researchers have paid attention to interfirm trust 
and its benefits from theoretical and empirical 
perspectives (Sako & Helper, 1998; Zaheer et al., 
1998; Das, 1998; Blois, 1999; Blomqvist et al. 
2002; Dyer & Chu, 2003; Krishnan et al., 2006). 
Interfirm trust has also been measured and 
evaluated widely by using several approaches 
(Sako & Helper, 1998; Zaheer et al., 1998; 
Krishnan et al., 2006).  
Depending on the theoretical perspective of their 
work, researchers have used different trust 
measurement techniques. But basically, two 
approaches can be distinguished in the literature 
on trust measurement. Much of the business 
research relies upon survey questions to measure 
trust. In this approach trust is regarded as a belief 
or an expectation (e.g. Mayer et al., 1995; 
McAllister, 1995; Robinson, 1996; Zaheer et al., 
1998). The other approach treats trust as a 
behavior and measures trust by means of game 
playing (McKelvey & Palfrey, 1992; Rapoport et 
al., 2003; Camerer & Weigelt, 1988; Rosenthal, 
1981).   
 
2.2 Behavioral supply management 
Sterman’s (1989) seminal paper was the first to 
describe behavioral experiment. He uses a beer 
distribution game setting with no stationary 
demand (beginning at four units and jumping to 
eight units), which is unknown to chain members. 
Other researchers use many different settings of 
the beer distribution game. These settings vary on 
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the number of echelons, number of echelons 
played by human agent, lead-time (fixed or 
stochastic), demand (known or unknown; 
fixed/deterministic or random/stochastic; 
Stationary or not), availability of information (local 
or system wide), supply line visibility (supply line 
information shared or not with other players) and 
finally on the version of the game used. Croson & 
Donohue (2006) show that even in the absence of 
all operational causes of bullwhip, order 
variation/oscillation is still observed in orders 
placed by human decision makers. Sterman`s 
(1989) observations show that underweighting the 
supply line and relying merely on the on-hand 
inventory is the cause of the bullwhip effect (both 
aspects: oscillation and amplification). To study 
how neglecting time delays affects the bullwhip 
effect, experiments are conducted by either 
reducing the lead-times, or giving players the 
required information for making ordering decision. 
Kaminsky & Simchi-Levi (1998) and Steckel et al., 
(2004) study the impact of order and delivery lags. 
Kaminsky & Simchi-Levi (1998) observe that 
when the order information delay and lead-time 
for the shipment are reduced, the total cost of 
supply chain decreases even though the order 
variability amplification still persists. Steckel et al., 
(2004) also show that reducing lead-times results 
in lower costs. Chatfield et al., (2004) analyze the 
impact of stochastic lead-time and information 
quality on bullwhip. They observe that an increase 
in the variance of the stochastic lead-time results 
in higher bullwhip, while information sharing 
dampens it. Croson & Donohue  (2003) observe 
that sharing the point of sale (POS) data can 
significantly reduce order oscillation and the 
overall supply chain cost. Croson & Donohue 
(2006)  further find that sharing echelon inventory 
information with the entire supply chain dampens 
order oscillations. Interestingly, Croson et al., 
(2013) show that even in an experiment where 
demand is fixed and known to all players, and the 
game is started at the optimal inventory level, still 
a bullwhip effect occurs.  The authors suggest that 
this behavior is linked to coordination risk, which 
means that players build inventory in order to 
protect themselves against the risk that others will 
deviate from optimal behavior. Machuca & 
Barajas (2004) find that implementing modern 
data-processing environment (e.g., EDI or 
electronic data interchange) across the supply 
chain leads to supply chain cost savings. Wu & 
Katok (2006) investigate the effect of learning and 
communication on the bullwhip effect. They find 
that collaboration in formulating the order 
strategies results in lower order variability and 
also when system wide experience of the game 
(learning) is gained, bullwhip effect is reduced 
significantly. Therefore, the supply chain 
performance is ameliorated by allowing the 
players to communicate and coordinate through 
knowledge sharing and by repeating the game 
(i.e. training) as players gain knowledge, 
experience and understanding of the system. 
Motivated by Tversky & Kahneman`s (1974) 
availability heuristic, Oliva & Gonçalves (2005) 
and Dogan & Sterman (2006) study overreaction 
to backlogs (capacity shocks since backorders 
cost more than on-hand inventory), Oliva & 
Gonçalves (2005) suggest that players treat their 
own on-hand inventory different from backorder. 
Their finding suggests that rather than 
overreacting to backorders and placing panicked 
orders, participants tend to ignore their own 
backorders.  
 
2.3 Literature review gap summary 
Trust as a behavioral factor plays a crucial role in 
decision-making. Although the above mentioned 
studies, among many others, have made 
important contributions to the literature, studies 
addressing the role of trust on supply chain 
inventory replenishment decision are limited. Trust 
has been measured in the literature using either 
surveys or game playing. Surveys can capture the 
perception and the games the behavior. The idea 
of perception leading to behavior has been 
recognized in the literature  and the underlying 
assumption is that perceptual and behavioral 
representations are linked (Dijksterhuis & van 
Knippenberg, 1998). Hence, behavior and 
perception cannot be studied separately as these 
two are interrelated. This study uses a 
combination of game playing method and surveys 
to measure the perception of trust in order to 
study the inventory holding behavior of the 
players. 
 
A number of behavioral factors have been studied 
using experiments and beer distribution game with 
main focus on the bullwhip effect reduction. 
Hence, the focus of the vast literature is on 
bullwhip effect and bullwhip reduction rather than 
identifying the main drivers of order quantity and 
order time variation. 
 
2.4 Motivations and goals 
We try to understand the ordering behavior- which 
leads to stability or instability of the chain- under 
the presence of different types and levels of trust. 
The aim of the study is to gain insight on how trust 
and inventory replenishment behavior are linked. 
The conclusions of this study would contribute to 
the lack in the literature by presenting evidence on 
how perception of trust and inventory 
replenishment decision indicators may mutually 
affect each other.  
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3 Experimental setting and 
procedure 
A participatory simulation platform based on the 
beer distribution game structure, called 
XBeerGame and developed at Laval University 
(see, Montreuil et al. 2008) is used in this study. 
We consider the situation of a three-echelon serial 
supply chain of a single item with a normal 
random demand pattern. The demand is 
generated by the market which is played by a 
computer agent. The decision-makers need to 
select the timing and quantity of replenishments 
so as to minimize the total of holding and backlog 
costs. 48 students, 39% female and 61% male, 
24% bachelor, 44% master, and 22% PhD, from 
two Swiss universities, with engineering and 
business background participate in this 
experiment 
The game is played over eight rounds and there is 
no cancelation for backorders by either the buyer 
or the supplier. Before the start of each round the 
participants are given the trust questionnaire to 
find out their perception of trust for the upcoming 
round. This indicated trust of the participant is 
assumed to affect the decisions made by the 
participant at that round. Two types of trust are 
identified: (1) trust of a customer in the supplier 
(Ts), (2) trust of a supplier in the customer (Tc). 
The trust construct is based on four items: 
intention (My supplier (customer) will not use 
opportunities that arise to take advantage at my 
expense), competence (My supplier (customer) 
knows how to efficiently manage his/her 
company), commitment (My supplier (customer) is 
committed to on time delivery-stable ordering 
behavior), and reputation (My supplier (customer) 
has reputation for on time delivery-stable ordering 
behavior) (see Kaboli 2013, for further 
information). To avoid an end of the game effect, 
the duration of the game is not announced in 
advance. 
4 Results and discussions 
Experiments are designed to investigate the effect 
of certain variables, called focus variables. Focus 
variables should be systematically manipulated 
between treatments (Katok, 2011). Trust can be 
indirectly manipulated by sharing information or 
letting players collaborate / communicate within 
the chains, etc. but the nature of trust makes it 
hard to directly use “treatment” and “control” 
groups because trust is dynamic and fluctuates all 
the time, but a level of trust is always present. In 
this study, trust is measured using the Likert scale 
and the measured trust shows the overall trust 
perception of each participant at a certain time. 
The midpoint split procedure is used; the sample 
is divided into different clusters using the midpoint 
of the trust scale designated as "neither agree nor 
disagree". Those responses falling above the 
midpoint, in the "agree" area, are considered to 
have high trust and those falling below the 
midpoint are considered to have low level of trust 
and inventory replenishment behavior of players is 
studied within each cluster. 
 
Echelons 
4: Retailer, Wholesaler, Distributor, 
Factory 
Human  role 3: Retailer, Wholesaler, Distributor 
Lead time 
Shipping delays: 2 days, 
 Ordering delay: 1 day, 
 Production delays: 2 days 
Demand 
function Normal random variable (3000, 500) 
Known/ known 
demand Unknown 
Information 
availability Local 
Supply line 
visibility None 
Game version XBeerGame 
Initial on-hand 
inventory 9000 units 
Initial transit-in Zero 
Initial transit-out Zero 
Table 1: Experimental settings 
In the following subsections, the relation between 
customer behavior and trust in customer is firstly 
analyzed, then the trust levels among the supply 
chain echelons are studied and finally the possible 
links between trust categories and replenishment 
indicators are discussed. 
 
4.1 Customer behavior and trust in 
customer 
 
The midpoint split procedure is used and the 
whole data is divided into two categories of high 
versus low trust in customer. The customer 
behavior is characterized by the mean and 
standard deviation of the received order quantity 
(ROQ) and received order time (ROT) of the 
previous round to see how the performance of the 
customer in this round (ROQi and ROTi) is related 
to the trust in customer of next round (TCi+1).  As 
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depicted in Table 2, high trust in customer is 
associated with small and frequent received 
orders and a high stability of the customer 
behavior (low SD and CV). On the contrary, low 
trust in customer corresponds to large and less 
frequent received orders and to a high variability 
of the customer behavior (high SD and CV). 
 
The required data (such as the shipments of the 
orders) to analyze the performance of the supplier 
was not available on the version of the software 
used for this study, therefore, the link between 
trust in supplier and the supplier`s performance 
could not be verified. However, the latest version 
of the XBeer game provides all sorts of 
information and further research can be done on 
investigating this relationship. 
 
 Trust in customer (Tci+1) 
Received Order quantity 
(ROQ) High Low 
Mean µROQi 2937,93 5092,54 
Standard deviation SDROQi 2220,17 6638,13 
Coefficient of 
variation 
CVROQi 0,76 1,30 
Received Order time (ROT)   
Mean µROTi 23,34 25,06 
Standard deviation SDROTi 18,45 29,39 
Coefficient of 
variation 
CVROTi 0,79 1,172 
Number of 
observations N 149 103 
Table 2: Trust in customer and variability of received 
orders. 
 
4.2 Trust levels among supply chain echelons 
 
Results of a role based analysis of high versus 
low trust are provided in Table 3. They reveal that 
moving upstream along the supply chain, the ratio 
of players having high trust in their customer 
decreases from 43% for the retailers to 27% for 
the distributors. Benefiting from the smooth supply 
and demand from the factory and market roles 
played by computer agents, most of the retailers 
have high trust in their customers (market) 
whereas the distributors have high trust in their 
suppliers (factory). The highest ratio of low trust in 
customer (41%) is found for the distributors 
whereas highest ratio of high trust in customer 
(43%) is observed for the retailers. 
Trust in supplier follows rather a different pattern. 
The highest ratio of high trust in supplier (38%) is 
not surprisingly found for the distributors as a 
computer agent played the factory role. But the 
highest ratio of low trust in supplier (42%) is 
observed among the wholesalers and not the 
retailers who show an equal ratio of high and low 
trust in supplier. 
 
Role  High Tc Low Tc High Ts Low Ts 
 
Retailer 43% 22% 33% 33% 
Wholesaler 30% 37% 29% 42% 
Distributor 27% 41% 38% 25% 
N 162 126 187 101 
Table 3: Frequency of each role per trust categories 
 
The study of the frequencies of the rounds in each 
trust category shows no specific link between the 
round and the level of trust. Thus, high trust in 
customer or supplier can happen at any round of 
the game and no clear pattern could be identified.  
 
4.3 Inventory replenishment indicators 
 
Using the same midpoint split procedure, the 
sample is divided this time into four categories of 
high trust in customer (Tc) - high trust in supplier 
(Ts), Low Tc- High Ts, High Tc- Low Ts and Low 
Tc- Low Ts. The characteristics of the 
replenishment decision are then reported in each 
trust category. 
 
Three decision indicators are considered: 
• On-hand inventory (OI): amount of products 
immediately available for shipping 
• Supply line (SL): amount of products ordered 
to supplier but not yet delivered 
• Net inventory (NI): OI+SL– amount to be 
shipped 
 
Table 4 reports the mean of these three indicators 
in each trust category. The results indicate that the 
decision indicators vary significantly between trust 
categories. Comparing the categories Low/Low 
trust versus High/High trust, a marked difference 
in all three indicators is noticed. SL and OI are 
much higher in the L/L category, while the reverse 
is true for NI. 
 
Considering the Low/High and High/Low 
categories, it can be seen that: 
• SL is closer to the Low/Low category for both 
• OI of Low/High category is close to Low/low 
• OI of High/low category is close to High/High 
• NI of Low/High category is close to Low/low 
• NI of High/low category is close to High/High 
At first glance, it appears that SL is reduced only if 
both trust types are high and that OI and NI are 
mostly dependent on Tc. 
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Category H/H L/H H/L L/L 
Tc High Low High Low 
Ts High High Low Low 
SL µ 8802 10460 10068 10668 
OI µ 3558 6941 4097 6297 
NI µ 8895 11617 10451 12116 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for supply line, on hand 
inventory and net inventory in trust categories 
 
To understand the difference of decision making 
process in each category of trust, regression 
analysis is used and decisions are decomposed 
into their underlying decision weights. Following 
the literature (Sterman, 1989 and Croson & 
Donohue, 2003) each model expresses a player’s 
ordering decision as a function of several random 
variables so that each regression compares 
heuristics for orders placed in round t by individual 
i, against the participant’s on-hand inventory level; 
orders received, and supply line level for order 
quantity; for order time the regression model 
includes average time between received orders 
and on hand inventory (standard deviation of 
received orders and supply line were also 
included in the model, but using the stepwise 
method of analysis in SPSS, both were excluded 
in all settings, meaning that both parameters are 
not considered into decision heuristics of the 
decision makers). Two models have been studied; 
one for order quantity and the other for the time 
between orders. Table 5 (order quantity) and Table 
6 (order time) show a summary of the results of 
linear regression. The stepwise method of 
regression is used in order to find out which 
independent variables have influence on these 
two dependent variables. In this sense, the 
models indicate which parameter stays in the final 
model and which ones are excluded.  
 
Model I: OQit = B0 + Br ROQit + BsL SLit + 
BOIOIit(1) 
With: 
OQit = mean order quantity of individual i in round 
t 
ROQit = mean received order quantity by 
individual i in round t 
SLit = mean supply line of individual i in round t 
OIit = mean on-hand inventory of individual i in 
round t 
 
The values of the obtained coefficients for Model I 
are given in Table 5. 
 
 
 
Category H/H L/H H/L L/L 
Tc High Low High Low 
Ts High High Low Low 
B0 (constant) -1,136 -0,491 -2,334* 0,813 
Br 0,647** 0,618*** 0,949*** ---- 
BSL 0,462*** 0,292*** 0,486*** 0,319** 
BOI ------- 0,102* ---- 0,226** 
R2 0,185 0,753 0,610 0,435 
R2 (adjusted) 0,169 0,743 0,595 0,410 
RMSE 4,776 3,476 3,658 2,663 
Observations 109 78 53 48 
Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%. 
Table 5: Regression model for order quantity 
 
Model II: OTit = B0 + Brot ROTit + BOI OIit (2) 
With: 
OTit = mean time between orders of individual i in 
round t 
ROTit = mean time between received orders by 
individual i in round t 
The values of the obtained coefficients for Model 
II are given in Table 6. 
 
Category H/H L/H H/L L/L 
Tc High Low High Low 
T s High High Low Low 
B0 (constant) 
13,37 40,95 21,66 27,05 
Brot 
0,638*** ------ 0,703** 0,012*** 
BOI 
0,0040*** 0,002** ------ ------ 
R2 0,233 0,075 0,350 0,473 
R2 (adjusted) 0,218 0,063 0,337 0,462 
RMSE 35,82 60,26 19,55 32,21 
Observations 109 78 53 48 
Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 1%; *** significant at 0.1%. 
Table 6: Regression model for order time 
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 It must be noticed that this analysis assumed 
independence between the data of each two 
round. This is certainly not the case for adjacent 
rounds, but as adjacent rounds are only rarely 
found in the same trust category, the assumption 
of independence is considered as acceptable for a 
first analysis. More sophisticated statistical 
analysis is foreseen in future work. 
 
The results presented in Tables 5 and 6 indicate 
some differences in the replenishment decision 
process: 
 
In the H/H trust category, it appears that 
participants decide about the order quantity on the 
basis of the received order quantity and the 
supply line, ignoring the on-hand inventory. Their 
ordering time decision seems to depend mainly on 
the received order time. 
In the L/L trust category, the decision about the 
order quantity does not seem to depend on the 
received order quantity, but on the supply line and 
the on-hand inventory. The ordering time decision 
shows a very weak (0.012) dependence on the 
received order time. In a first approximation, this 
decision can be looked at as independent of any 
of the considered independent variables. 
 
In the H/L trust category, the decision about the 
order quantity is similar to that observed in the 
H/H category; it appears to depend on both the 
received order quantity and the supply line, 
ignoring again the on-hand inventory.  Also the 
ordering time decision seems to depend mainly on 
the received order time, as in the H/H category. 
Thus categories H/H and H/L do not show any 
significant differences, except for the value of 
some coefficients. 
 
In the L/H trust category, the decision about the 
order quantity depends on the received order 
quantity, on the supply line and the on-hand 
inventory (although relatively weakly). The 
ordering time decision shows a very weak (0.002) 
dependence on the on-hand inventory. Thus, in a 
first approximation, this decision can be 
considered as independent of any of the retained 
independent variables. 
 
These different decision processes are 
summarized in Figure 1, which illustrates the 
weights of the independent variables considered 
in choosing the two replenishment parameters OQ 
and OT. It clearly appears that the decision 
process can be considered as identical in the H/H 
and H/L categories. The L/L category shows a 
very specific decision process based solely on SL 
and OI. The decision process in the L/H category 
represents an intermediary situation between the 
L/L and H/H ones, while being relatively close to 
the L/L category; main difference is the role of 
ROQ in the setting the order quantity. 
Comparing the decision process between the two 
extreme cases, i.e. H/H versus L/L, the following 
conclusions can be drawn. 
 
In the H/H situation, the decision variables are 
ROQ, SL and ROT, three variables that represent 
the behavior of the customer (ROQ, ROT) and 
partially the behavior of the supplier (SL). Thus it 
appears that in a high trust situation, the 
participant bases his/her decision essentially on 
the basis of his/her supply chain partner’s 
behavior. 
 
In the L/L situation on the contrary, the decision 
variables are SL, and OI only. This can be seen as 
decision based essentially on the local situation 
with little regards to the behavior of the supply 
chain partners. 
 
Whether the decision process is the consequence 
of the trust situation or the reverse cannot be 
concluded here, but a link between the two 
elements clearly appears. 
 
It is also interesting to note that in the L/H 
situation, which corresponds to a loss of trust in 
the customer, ROT is not considered in the 
decision process, as in the L/L situation, but that 
OI is then considered. This is the indication of a 
decision process with a weaker link to customer 
behavior than in a high trust in customer situation 
(H/H and H/L). 
 
On the contrary, in the H/L situation, both ROQ 
and ROT are again considered, indicating a 
strong link of the decision process with the 
customer behavior. 
 
 
Figure 1: Summary of the influencing factors in decision 
making in each trust category. 
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5 Conclusions 
The work reported here is the result of an 
experimental study, under controlled conditions, of 
the role of trust in supply chain and more 
specifically on the inventory replenishment 
process. It shows evidence of the link between 
trust and supply chain partner performances. In 
particular, it is shown that the level of trust in 
customer depends on the volatility of the ordering 
process of the customer; the less volatile the 
ordering behavior, the higher the level of trust.  
Role based analysis of trust reveals that, due to 
the non-volatile demand of the market, the retailer 
shows the highest ratio of high trust in customer in 
the supply chain, while distributor (having the 
most reliable supplier) exhibits the highest ratio of 
high trust in supplier. 
The analysis of the obtained experimental results 
leads to interesting findings concerning the 
inventory replenishment decision process. It is in 
particular found that the integration of the supply 
chain partner behavior in the decision process is 
linked to the corresponding trust level. In case of a 
high trust level, the replenishment decision takes 
the characteristics of the partner’s ordering 
behavior into account, while in case of low trust in 
the partner the replenishment decision is taken 
essentially on the basis of local parameters. 
 
The findings of this study add to the existing 
knowledge on behavioral supply chain 
management and provide insights into the 
replenishment decision process. The study has 
however some limitations. The first limitation is 
due to the procedure adopted for the investigation 
of the role of trust on inventory replenishment, 
which is based on a multi-criteria trust 
measurement through questionnaires and does 
not use any treatment. This experimental 
procedure has however the advantage of 
providing quantitative, while approximate, 
description of the trust level that can then be 
easily used for analysis. Another limitation 
acknowledged in this study is the fact that the 
multiple regressions used in data analysis assume 
independence of the data for each round. 
Although this is statistically not proven, the fact 
that adjacent rounds are not often found in 
identical categories makes this approximation 
acceptable for a first analysis. The low adjusted 
R2 of the model under some trust conditions along 
with their high RMSE makes the model poor in 
prediction (specially for order time). How high the 
coefficient of determination (R2) should be to show 
that the model fits the data well enough is a 
question that does not have a clear-cut answer. It 
depends on the intended use of the regression 
model. If the model is intended to be used for 
prediction, the higher the R2, the more accurate 
will the predictions be (Aczel, 2008). The 
regression models used in this study are however 
not to be used as predictors of order time and 
order quantity, but in order to find out which 
independent variables have influence on the two 
dependent variables. In other words, the purpose 
of the model is limited to finding out which variable 
stays in the final model and which one is 
excluded. In this sense, it fulfills the research goal, 
which is to gain insights into the replenishment 
decision process. However the R2 might get 
improved in further studies, by 1) incorporating 
other predictors such as shipment data, or 
2)increasing the power of predictors by using 
quadric or cubic models. 
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